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I. Background to the Initiative
On October 11, 1985, the Board of Governors of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (the Bank), at its Annual Meeting in
Seoul, opened for signature a convention establishing a new international
development institution, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA or Agency).' MIGA is designed to encourage the flow of invest-
ment to and among developing countries by issuing guarantees against
non-commercial risk and carrying out a wide range of promotional activi-
ties.
Early initiatives to create an international investment guarantee facility
emerged in the 1950s, and the concept was discussed in the early 1960s in
various international fora, such as the Bank, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank,
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Euro-
pean Community. While none of these earlier initiatives materialized, a
regional agency, the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation, was
established in 1974 and has been operating successfully since then.
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1. The Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency [hereinafter
referred to as the Convention or MIGA Convention], together with the official Commentary is
reprinted in 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1598 (1985), and is also reprinted in the first issue of
ICSID REV. - FOR. INV. L. J. (1986).
2. See T. MERON, INVESTMENT INSURANCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 30-37 (1976), on the
previous efforts of the World Bank towards the establishment of an International Investment
Insurance Agency; Shihata, Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation-A Regional Investment
Insurance Project, 6 J. WORLD TRADE L. 185 (1972) on the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee
Corporation; and Voss, The Protection and Promotion of European Private Investment in
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The initiative to create a globally operating investment guarantee agency
under the Bank's auspices was resumed by the President of the Bank, Mr.
A. W. Clausen, in his first annual address before the Bank's Board of
Governors in September 1981. After extensive studies and discussions
within the Bank on the desirability of a multilateral investment guarantee
scheme, a concrete proposal was devised and circulated to the Bank's
member governments in May 1984.
On the basis of this proposal and in the light of the comments received, the
Bank's staff prepared a first draft Convention and submitted it to the Bank's
Executive Directors in October 1984. The staff subsequently held consulta-
tions with member governments of the Bank, both individually and in
groups, as well as with business and professional associations and interna-
tional organizations. As a result of these consultations, the interest in and
support for the proposed MIGA broadened considerably. The draft Con-
vention was revised in the light of the consultations and a second draft was
circulated to member governments on March 8, 1985.
At its April 1985 meeting in Washington, D.C., the Joint Ministerial
Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the International
Monetary Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries
(the Development Committee) endorsed the Bank's efforts "to reach an
understanding among governments for the creation of MIGA on a voluntary
basis." From June to September 1985, the Bank's Executive Directors met
as a "Committee of the Whole" under the chairmanship of the Bank's
Vice-President and General Counsel in order to discuss the March 8, 1985
draft Convention. Assisted by experts from member governments and by a
drafting team from the Bank's Legal Department, the Committee of the
Whole succeeded in formulating a revised draft Convention on September
15, 1985 after twenty sessions of vivid and at times heated discussions.
After its formal approval by the Bank's Executive Directors, this draft
Convention was submitted to the Bank's Board of Governors for considera-
tion at its Annual Meeting in Seoul. There the Governors adopted a resolu-
tion approving the Convention for transmittal to member Governments of
the Bank and the Government of Switzerland, and inviting these Govern-
ments to sign the Convention. As of June 25, 1986, thirty countries, includ-
ing five Category One and twenty-five Category Two countries, 3 had signed
the Convention.
The Convention will enter into force upon its ratification by at least five
Category One countries and fifteen Category Two countries, provided that
these countries subscribe to at least one third of MIGA's capital (approx-
Developing Countries-An Approach towards a Concept for a European Policy on Foreign
Investment, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 363 (1981) on the discussions in the European Com-
munity.
3. Under the Convention, countries are classified for voting purposes as belonging to either
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imately $360 million). The subscriptions of the countries which have so far
signed the Convention account for over forty percent of MIGA's capital.
However, in view of the relatively lengthy ratification procedures of many
countries, it may be some time before the Convention enters into force. To
enable the Agency to commence operations immediately after the Conven-
tion's entry into force, the Governors have authorized the President of the
Bank to convene a committee of the signatory States to prepare for consid-
eration by MIGA's governing bodies the initial draft bylaws, rules and
regulations needed to initiate the Agency's operations. This committee is
scheduled to meet in September 1986.
The Bank's sponsorship of MIGA's establishment falls within the Bank's
objectives of facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes
and promoting private foreign investment. 4 Consistent with these objec-
tives, the Bank sponsored the establishment of the International Finance
Corporation 5 and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) 6 and recently further developed its co-financing tech-
niques to stimulate increased commercial lending to developing countries.
Mechanisms for encouraging a greater level of direct investment to de-
veloping countries may be needed now more than ever before. In the 1970s,
development was largely financed by commercial lending. Total outstanding
debt of developing countries grew sharply, and is estimated to reach $970
billion by the end of 1985. This has led to the recent world debt crisis and
prompted banks to reduce lending to developing countries drastically. New
efforts are being made to attract substantial amounts of new commercial
loans to debt-stricken developing countries but the chances of substantial
net transfers do not appear to be very promising in the near future. As
official development assistance is also stagnating, foreign direct investment
represents a source of external finance which holds a great promise for
substantial increases, given a clear improvement in the investment climate.
Unlike foreign loans, such investment does not generate demands on the
host country's balance of payments except when it generates revenues.
Category One or Category Two. Countries listed under Category Two are also defined as
"developing countries" for the purpose of the Convention.
4. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, opened for signature Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, at
Art. 1, paras. (i) and (ii).
5. See Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation, done on May 25,
1955, 7 U.S.T. 2197, T.I.A.S. No. 3620, 264 U.N.T.S. 117.
6. The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, done Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 and the
Text of the World Bank Executive Directors' REPORT are reproduced in 4 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 524 (1965). Recent studies of ICSID include, Broches, The Experience of the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
DISPUTES: AVOIDANCE AND SETrLEMENT 75 (S. Rubin and R. Nelson eds. 1985), and Soley,
ICSID Implementation: An Effective Alternative to International Conflict, 19 INT'L LAW. 521
(1985).
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However, direct investment flows to developing countries have not been
increasing in recent years. In fact, they decreased markedly from $17.2
billion in 1981 to $11.8 billion in 1982 and to $7.8 billion in 1983. There are
strong indications that viable investment opportunities exist in developing
countries but that investors tend to avoid these opportunities because of
concerns about risks which are basically of a non-commercial or political
nature. MIGA is designed to overcome this obstacle to increased invest-
ment flows by providing insurance protection and contributing to the overall
improvement and stabilization of investment conditions in host countries.
Although the idea of a multilateral investment guarantee facility is not
new, MIGA differs from earlier proposals in five main areas:
(1) While previous concepts focused exclusively on guarantee opera-
tions, MIGA will provide a broader forum for international policy coop-
eration among capital-importing countries, capital-exporting countries
and foreign investors. Insurance is only one means of achieving MIGA's
broader objective of encouraging investment flows for productive pur-
poses.
(2) Earlier proposals centered on investment flows from developed coun-
tries, but MIGA is directed also, and in fact specifically, to take part in the
promotion of investment flows among developing countries.
(3) Unlike previous schemes, which envisaged an agency closely linked
with the Bank, MIGA is designed to be an autonomous institution which
will operate on its own account and within its own responsibility while
maintaining a symbolic, but significant, link with the Bank. In accordance
with the MIGA Convention, the Bank's President will be ex officio
Chairman of MIGA's Board of Directors and will nominate the Agency's
chief executive officer.
(4) Political oversight of and financial responsibility for MIGA will be
shared by both home and host countries, while earlier proposals envis-
aged an agency controlled and financed solely by the investors' home
countries.
(5) Finally, more than previous conceptions, the Convention contains a
number of safeguards which ensure the host governments' control over
investment activities in their territories while requiring MIGA to work on
the improvement of investment conditions and standards in agreement
with these governments.
II. Operational Features
The objective of MIGA is to encourage the flow of investments for
productive purposes among its member countries, and in particular to
developing member countries. MIGA is intended to enhance mutual under-
standing and confidence between host governments and foreign investors,
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heighten awareness of investment opportunities and increase information,
knowledge and expertise related to the investment process. To fulfill its
purposes, MIGA will guarantee eligible investments against losses resulting
from non-commercial risk and carry out research and promotional activi-
ties.
The MIGA Convention specifically provides for coverage of four broad
categories of non-commercial risk but authorizes the Agency to cover any
other non-commercial risk upon the joint application of the investor and the
host country and by a special majority decision of the Agency's Board of
Directors. The four risks specified in the Convention are: (1) the transfer
risk resulting from host government restrictions on currency conversion and
transfer; (2) the risk of loss resulting from legislative actions or administra-
tive actions or omissions of the host government which have the effect of
depriving the foreign investor of his ownership or control of, or substantial
benefits from, his investment; (3) the repudiation or breach of government
contracts in the cases where the investor has no access to a competent
judicial or arbitral forum, or faces unreasonable delays in such a forum or is
unable to enforce a judicial or arbitral decision issued in his favor; and (4)
the risk of armed conflict and civil disturbance. At present, the "transfer
risk" is probably the most relevant from the viewpoint of investors as cases
of outright expropriation have become infrequent. The value of the expro-
priation coverage will depend largely on MIGA's ability to cope with the
problem of "creeping expropriation" and expropriation in the guise of
apparently legal measures adopted by the host government.7 Article
11(a)(ii) of the Convention excludes from coverage "non-discriminatory
measures of general application which governments normally take for the
purpose of regulating economic activity in their territories." This exclusion
is not meant to confine coverage under that provision to outright expropria-
tion. The exclusion applies only to host governmental measures that meet all
its requirements, i.e., to measures that (a) do not discriminate against the
investor, (b) are normally taken by governments, and (c) are taken for the
purpose of regulating economic activities in the host country's territory. The
Commentary on the Convention, which was also approved by the Bank's
Executive Directors, lists as examples of such measures "taxation, environ-
mental and labor legislation as well as normal measures for the maintenance
of public safety." MIGA's regulations and the contracts of guarantee to be
entered into between MIGA and the investors should define the risks to be
covered precisely in order to avoid any misunderstanding in this respect. As
the Convention states the above-mentioned exclusion in the context of the
7. See Voss, The Protection and Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing
Countries: Interest, Interdependencies, Intricacies, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 686, 702 (1982).
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risks eligible for cover, such an exclusion should be made clear at the time of
coverag6 and could not appropriately be cited as an excuse for nonpayment
by the Agency in respect of a loss resulting from a covered risk which is
clearly described in a contract of guarantee signed by the Agency.
To be eligible, investments will have to be new and of a medium- or
long-term nature. They must be judged by the Agency as sound investments
which contribute to the development of the host country, comply with its
laws and are consistent with its declared development objectives and priori-
ties. At the outset, MIGA will focus on equity interests and other forms of
direct investment, 8 but it may be authorized by its Board, acting by a special
majority vote, 9 to expand coverage to "any other medium- or long-term
form of investment." This could include various forms of industrial coopera-
tion such as management and service contracts, licensing and franchising
agreements and turnkey contracts, as well as arrangements concerning the
transfer of technology and know-how where the investor assumes a stake in
the performance of the venture.' 0 This will enable MIGA to service several
new types of non-equity investment that are commonly made in developing
countries. All eligible investment must, however, represent a provision of
assets for productive developmental purposes and thus may not include
other forms of expenditures such as those related to military purposes.
Investors, to be eligible for the Agency's guarantee, must be nationals of a
member country or, in the case of corporate investors, must either be
incorporated and have their principal place of business in a member coun-
try, or the majority of their capital must be owned by nationals of a member
or members. The Convention incorporates the innovative feature that eligi-
bility may be extended to nationals of the host country if they transfer the
assets to be invested from abroad." This feature of the Convention will
allow MIGA to assist member countries in their efforts to reduce the
problem of capital flight. It also emphasizes that MIGA's guarantee protec-
tion relates primarily to the transfer of funds into the host country from
abroad for development purposes rather than merely to the foreign
nationality of the investors.
8. The IMF BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL para. 408, at 136 (4th ed. 1977) defines foreign
direct investment as "investment that is made to acquire a lasting interest in an enterprise
operating in an economy other than that of the investor, the investor's purpose being to have an
effective voice in the management of the enterprise." See also OECD, DETAILED BENCHMARK
DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (1983).
9. According to Article 3(d) of the Convention, a special majority requires a vote of not less
than two-thirds of MIGA's total voting power representing at least fifty-five percent of its
subscribed capital.
10. For a survey and discussion of the new forms of investment, see C. OMAN, NEW FORMS OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1984).
11. MIGA Convention, supra note 1, Art. 13(c).
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In recognition of host governments' sovereign control over both the
admission of foreign investment into their territories and the treatment of
such investment, MIGA "shall not conclude any contract of guarantee
before the host government has approved the issuance of the guarantee by
the Agency against the risks designated for cover."' 12 The approval must
hence extend to the issuance of the guarantee, i.e., MIGA's involvement,
and the risks designated for cover, i.e., the scope of MIGA's involvement.
Every host government would be free to withhold its approval. It could also
limit its approval to certain types of risk, for example, the transfer risk. The
Agency would then reflect these limitations in its contract of guarantee with
the investor. To avoid administrative delays in the approval process, MIGA
could advise host governments that unless an objection was presented
within a reasonable period of time, the proposal would be deemed
approved. Article 38(b) of the Convention permits this procedure for
approvals on a no-objection basis.
Article 12(d) of the Convention establishes a number of conditions which
an investment must meet in order to qualify for a guarantee. Some of these
conditions reflect MIGA's developmental objectives. Others seek to protect
its financial viability.' 3 As already mentioned, the Agency must be satisfied
that proposed investments comply with the host country's laws and regula-
tions, are consistent with its declared development objectives and priorities,
are economically sound, and contribute to its development. The investment
conditions of the host country must also be assessed, including the availabil-
ity of fair and equitable treatment and legal protection for the investment.
Where, in MIGA's opinion, such conditions do not exist, it would seek to
enter into an agreement with the potential host country on the treatment of
investments guaranteed by it. Such agreements, according to Article
23(b)(ii) of the Convention, "will assure that the Agency ... has treatment
at least as favorable as that agreed by the member concerned for the most
favored investment guarantee agency or State in an agreement related to
investment."
In addition to its guarantee operations, MIGA will carry out a variety of
promotional activities such as conducting research, providing information
and policy advice to member governments, and such technical assistance as
may be required in this field. In its promotional efforts, MIGA "shall give
12. Id. Art. 15. In the case of a host country national investing funds transferred from
abroad, the host government must, under Article 13(c) of the Convention, apply for the
guarantee jointly with the investor.
13. It should be noted, however, that the two aspects are interrelated, as investments that
are welcomed by host countries and serve their interests are less vulnerable to adverse host
governmental action.
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particular attention . . . to the importance of increasing the flow of invest-
ments among developing member countries.'
14
III. Legal Regime and Settlement of Disputes
Different sources of law will govern the various legal relationships in
which MIGA is expected to enter. The Convention establishes the institu-
tional framework and powers of MIGA. Questions of interpretation or
application of the Convention will be decided by MIGA's Board of Direc-
tors, and a member may appeal from the Board's decision to MIGA's
Council of Governors for a final determination.1 5 Within the framework of
the Convention, MIGA's Board of Directors or Council of Governors, as
the case may be, will approve and establish the policies, rules and regula-
tions for MIGA's operations and financial management.1 6 On the basis of
these rules and regulations, MIGA will conclude contracts of guarantee with
investors. These contracts will precisely specify the mutual rights and obliga-
tions of MIGA and the holders of a guarantee.17
Disputes arising under contracts of guarantee may be submitted to
arbitration for final determination. 18 The Convention does not provide
specific procedures for these disputes. It is anticipated that the contracts of
guarantee will contain provisions referring disputes to an internationally
recognized body of rules for commercial arbitration, such as the ICSID
arbitration rules, the arbitration rules developed by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) or the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration rules. When MIGA pays or
agrees to pay a claim, it will succeed or be subrogated to the rights that the
indemnified investor acquired against the host country as a result of the
event giving rise to his claim. 19 Subrogation, a generally accepted principle
of insurance law, would provide no more than the assignment of an existing
claim from the investor to MIGA and would give MIGA no greater substan-
tive rights than the investor had.
Disputes between MIGA and a host country arising from subrogation
would normally be settled by negotiation. If negotiations fail, the parties
may seek voluntary conciliation, or either party may refer the dispute
directly to international arbitration according to the procedures detailed in
an annex to the Convention. However, MIGA is also authorized under the
14. MIGA Convention, supra note 1, Art. 23(c).
15. Id. Art. 56.
16. See, e.g., id., Arts. 16, 17, 22, 26.
17. Cf. id., Art. 16.
18. Id. Art. 58.
19. Id. Art. 18.
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Convention to enter into bilateral agreements with individual host countries
on the resolution of such disputes using alternative mechanisms, provided
that the agreement is approved in each case by special majority of the Board
prior to the undertaking by the Agency of operations in the territory of the
member concerned. These agreements would override the dispute settle-
ment mechanism provided in the Convention. Although the latter directs
the parties to use such mechanism as a basis for their agreement, 20 it is
obvious that the agreement, if it is to be justified at all, would have to
provide for different methods which would presumably be consistent with
the constitutional requirements of the country concerned. Any other dis-
pute between MIGA and a member, that is where MIGA does not act as a
subrogee of a compensated investor, would be settled by international
arbitration if not settled through negotiations.21
IV. Organization, Membership, and Voting
MIGA will have full juridical personality and will function autonomously.
In particular, it will be both legally and financially separate from other
financial institutions. It will have a Council of Governors composed of one
representative of each member (and his alternate), a Board of Directors
elected by the Council, and a chief executive officer, called the President,
selected by the Board and responsible for the ordinary business of the
Agency.
Membership in MIGA is open to all members of the World Bank and to
Switzerland. A country's decision whether or not to join has no effect on its
position in the Bank or any other organization. Countries not joining at the
outset may accede later. This will give skeptical countries the opportunity to
observe MIGA's operations for a time and then decide in the light of actual
experience whether to join. It may be noted in this context that the ICSID
Convention entered into force after ratification by only twenty countries and
now has ninety-one signatories. It is hoped that MIGA will gradually gain
broad recognition and attract a large membership. Its success as both an
insurer and a forum for the development of policies regarding foreign
investment will depend on widespread membership and support for its
objectives.
MIGA's voting structure is based on the principle that both Category One
and Category Two countries22 have a mutual interest in foreign investment
and that both groups of countries should, when all eligible countries become
20. Id. Art. 57(b).
21. Id. Art. 57(a).
22. See supra note 3 on this classification of countries.
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members, have voting parity. Article 39 of the Convention provides that
each member country will receive 177 basic votes and one additional vote
per share. 23 During the first three years of the MIGA's existence, each
category of countries is assured a minimum of 40 percent of the total voting
power, by the allocation of supplementary votes if necessary. All decisions
during this initial period require a special majority vote of at least two-thirds
of the total voting power representing at least 55 percent of the subscribed
shares of MIGA's capital stock. This arrangement ensures that during the
important initial period decisions will be taken with the support of both
developing and developed countries. The supplementary votes and the
special majority requirement will be cancelled at the end of the three-year
period. MIGA's Council will then review the voting structure with a view to
reallocating shares to assure voting parity between both groups of countries
once they subscribe in the reallocated shares.
V. Financing: Self-Sufficiency and Joint Responsibility
MIGA's financial structure is designed to produce financial self-
sufficiency. It is expected to meet its liabilities from premium income and
other revenues such as return on its investments. The Convention therefore
directs MIGA to carry out its activities in accordance with sound business
and prudent financial management practices. 24 It might vary its premiums
according to the actual risks assumed under its guarantees. However, such
variations are expected to be based on the individual characteristics of a
project and should not reflect a political judgment about the host country.
The principle of self-sufficiency will be supported by arrangements to
ensure MIGA's financial viability even when losses exceed reserves at any
given moment. These arrangements include a combination of capital sub-
scriptions and "sponsorship."
MIGA will initially have a share capital of $1 billion Special Drawing
Rights. It will become operational when at least one third of this amount is
actually subscribed. The shares will be subscribed by member countries on
the basis of their relative economic strength measured according to their
allocation of shares in the capital of the World Bank. Only 10 percent of the
subscriptions will be paid in cash. An additional 10 percent will be paid in the
23. The number of membership votes was computed so that if all members of the World
Bank joined MIGA, developing countries as a group would have the same voting power as
developed countries as a group.
24. MIGA Convention, supra note 1, Art. 25.
25. Id. Art. 5(a). The Article provides, however, that: "All payment obligations of members
with respect to capital stock shall be settled on the basis of the average value of the SDR in terms
of United States dollars for the period January 1, 1981 to June 30, 1985," i.e., U.S. $1.082 per
one SDR.
VOL. 20, NO. 2
SYMPOSIUM/MIGA 495
form of non-negotiable, non-interest-bearing promissory notes to be en-
cashed only if needed by MIGA to meet its financial obligations. The
remainder of the subscribed capital will be subject to call. While developed
member countries will make payments in freely usable currencies, develop-
ing member countries will be able to make up to 25 percent of the paid-in
cash portion of their subscriptions in their own currencies.
The amount of guarantees which MIGA may issue will initially not exceed
one and a half times the amount of the subscribed capital plus reserves plus a
portion of MIGA's reinsurance coverage. Once MIGA accumulates a bal-
anced risk portfolio and gains experience, its Council of Governors can
increase this conservative risk-asset ratio up to a maximum of five-to-one.
In addition to guarantee operations based on the Agency's capital and
reserves, MIGA will be able to underwrite investments sponsored by mem-
ber countries acting in fact as administrator of a separate sponsorship
account. Revenues from sponsorship operations will be accumulated in a
"Sponsorship Trust Fund" which will be kept apart from the Agency's own
accounts. Claims and other expenses resulting from sponsorship operations
will be paid out of this fund. Upon its depletion, remaining liabilities will be
shared by sponsoring countries only, each in the proportion which the
guarantees sponsored by it bears to the total amount of guarantees spon-
sored by all sponsoring countries. This "sponsorship window" represents a
particularly interesting feature of MIGA not only because it has no financial
ceiling but also because it allows coverage of investments in all countries and
not just in MIGA's developing member countries.
VI. MIGA as an Instrument of Public Policy
to Improve Investment Conditions
MIGA is not envisaged as only an insurance mechanism. MIGA will also
seek to stabilize and improve investment climates in its developing member
countries and thus stimulate investment flows to these countries. This man-
date is reflected in a number of the provisions of the Convention. 26 It is
reinforced by MIGA's institutional structure and internal dynamics.
26. The Preamble recognizes that investment flows to developing countries "would be
facilitated and further encouraged by alleviating concerns related to non-commercial risks" and
expresses the desire of the Contracting States to enhance investment flows "on the basis of fair
and stable standards for the treatment of foreign investment." Article 12(d)(iv) makes satisfac-
tory investment conditions in the host country, "including the availability of fair and equitable
treatment and legal protection for the investment" prerequisites for coverage; and Article 23
provides that MIGA will "seek to remove impediments ... to the flow of investment to
developing member countries," "encourage the amicable settlement of investment disputes
between investors and host countries," endeavor to conclude with developing member coun-
tries agreements on the treatment of guarante'ed investments, and "promote and facilitate...
agreements ... on the promotion and protection of investments."
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In the past, the need for fair and stable investment conditions has been
emphasized from the point of view of investors and their home countries.
However, host countries clearly serve their national interests by providing
sound investment conditions. Their ability to attract badly needed resources
and to bargain for better terms and conditions is obviously strengthened by
the availability of better investment climates in their territories. The estab-
lishment of an international development institution, financed and con-
trolled jointly by developed and developing countries, manifests the com-
mon interest in creating a favorable investment climate in the latter coun-
tries.
Frequently, issues related to foreign investment have also become inter-
mingled with the political interests of home and host countries. As a result,
investment disputes often became highly politicized. MIGA seeks to re-
move these disputes from the political arena and ensure that they will be
resolved only on the basis of legal and economic criteria. 27 It is explicitly
prohibited from interfering in the political affairs of its members. 28 More-
over, MIGA's internal dynamics will result in its playing an important role
as an intermediary between investors and host countries. To attract business
and generate revenues, it must offer effective guarantee protection and pay
claims which are justified. To minimize underwriting losses, it must avoid
claims and, where they do occur, secure recovery from the host country
whenever possible. Recovery procedures could jeopardize MIGA's good
relations with developing member countries which could easily curtail
MIGA's operations by denying their approval for further guarantees.
Therefore, MIGA must ensure that the goodwill of member countries is not
lost and that their common interest in the Agency's functioning prevails over
the conflicting interests in a particular dispute.
The competing pressures will force MIGA to cover risks that are unlikely
to invite adverse host governmental action which could give rise to claims.
At the same time, MIGA will have to ensure that these investments are
accorded stable and predictable treatment. Article 12(d) of the Convention
reflects this balanced approach by directing MIGA to restrict its coverage to
investments which are compatible with the host country's laws and develop-
ment objectives and to require, on the other hand, that these investments be
given adequate treatment and protection.
27. Cf. Meron, The World Bank and Insurance, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 301,312 (1974-1975):
. the very raison d'6tre of the establishment of a multilateral insurance agency was to make
subrogation into a non-political, technical, non-confrontation issue"; Martin, Multilateral
Investment Insurance: the OECD Proposal, 8 HARV. INT'L L.J. 280, 318-319 (1967): "With an
international agency it is more likely that the claim will be treated as the legal issue that it should
be." Both comments referred to earlier proposals for the creation of an international agency for
political risk insurance.
28. MIGA Convention, supra note 1, Art. 34.
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Where disputes nevertheless arise between investors and host countries,
MIGA will become involved in the process of conflict resolution in a way
that will place it in a unique position to facilitate an amicable settlement.
The Convention indeed directs MIGA to encourage such settlements. 29 In
case of disputes, MIGA's assessment, based on the broad information
available to it, together with its worldwide experience, is likely to moderate
the conflicting claims of an investor and a host country and increase the
likelihood of a settlement.
Another way in which MIGA may encourage host governments and
investors to arrive at amicable settlements is to reduce the financial burden
of any settlements by accepting the local currency of the host country on a
temporary basis and paying the investor out of its own funds in freely usable
currency. MIGA might then, under an agreement with the host country,
30
sell the local currency to the Bank, other international institutions, com-
panies importing goods from the host country, or to the host government
itself over a period of time and restore its financial position accordingly.
MIGA might also facilitate the settlement by paying the investor in cash and
accepting debt instruments from the government as reimbursement. As a
variant of this approach, MIGA could persuade the investor to accept
installments rather than insisting on a cash payment by backing the govern-
ment's commitments with its guarantee. In view of its developmental man-
date and policy interests, MIGA can be anticipated to facilitate settlements
amicably at least as successfully as some of the national agencies have
done.3 ' In this, as well as in all its other activities, MIGA will be serving its
broad mandate of encouraging additional investment flows among its mem-
bers and to developing countries in particular.
29. Id. Art. 23(b)(i).
30. Article 18(c) of the MIGA Convention supra note 1, directs MIGA to "seek to enter into
agreements with host countries on . . . uses of. . . currencies to the extent that they are not
freely usable."
31. The United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has been especially
successful in this respect. According to unpublished figures recently obtained from OPIC, that
Corporation has settled claims in the total amount of $96 million by paying compensation in
cash to the investor while accepting installments from the host government; and claims totalling
some $292 million, by persuading investors to accept host government commitments backed by
OPIC guarantees or by a combination of cash payment and guarantees.
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